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Abstract
The paper is devoted to the study of some classes of feedback control problems for linear parabolic equa-
tions subject to hard/pointwise constraints on both Dirichlet boundary controls and state dynamic/output
functions in the presence of uncertain perturbations within given regions. The underlying problem under
consideration, originally motivated by automatic control of the groundwater regime in irrigation networks,
is formalized as a minimax problem of optimal control, where the control strategy is sought as a feedback
law. Problems of this type are among the most important in control theory and applications — while most
challenging and difficult. Based on the Maximum Principle for parabolic equations and on the time con-
volution structure, we reformulate the problems under consideration as certain asymmetric games, which
become the main object of our study in this paper. We establish some simple conditions for the existence of
winning and losing strategies for the game players, which then allow us to clarify controllability issues in
the feedback control problem for such constrained parabolic systems.
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This paper concerns feedback control design of state-constrained linear parabolic systems
functioning under uncertain disturbances/perturbations. The original motivating example [8]
came from a practical application: automatic control of the groundwater regime in irrigation
networks, where the main objective was to neutralize the adverse effect of uncertain weather
and environmental conditions. We immediately note that this needs not always be possible: obvi-
ously, for the system to be acceptable, we must be capable of handling the worst perturbations.
In particular:
• We must have enough irrigation capacity to keep the water supply up to the minimally ac-
ceptable level, even if there might be a drought for the entire period under consideration.
• Conversely, even if it might rain for the entire period, we must be able to reduce the irrigation
supply enough to avoid flooding.
Assuming it is possible to compensate adequately for adverse fluctuations in the weather,
one might then seek to optimize the policy used. Problems of this type may be formulated as
optimal control problems, unavoidably requiring the use of closed-loop feedback to obtain an
appropriate control, since the external input (weather, etc.) is not known in advance. Indeed, we
have minimax design problems, seeking to design the feedback to minimize some cost in the
presence of possibly worst case external inputs. The particular control systems modeled in [8,9]
were parabolic partial differential equations with Dirichlet boundary control. Among the impor-
tant specific features introduced there in order to meet practical requirements we mention the
following:
• distributed uncertain perturbations — taking values within given closed areas with only
bounds assumed to be known;
• hard control constraints — pointwise constraints on the control functions (here acting
through Dirichlet boundary conditions, offering minimal regularity for the linear dynamics);
• hard state constraints — pointwise constraints on the acceptable values of the evolving state
(with both perturbation and compensating control).
Problems with such features are among the most challenging and difficult in control theory but,
at the same time, are among the most important for applications. To the best of our knowledge,
a variety of approaches and results developed in the theories of differential games, H∞-control,
and Riccati’s feedback synthesis are not applicable to such problems; see, e.g., [1,3,4,6,7] and
also [9–12] with the discussions and references therein.
The approach developed in [9] for the case of one-dimensional heat/diffusion equations and
then partly extended in [10–12] to multidimensional settings mainly concerns the system reac-
tion to extreme perturbations, which (as suggested above) would seem to provide the ‘worst case’
scenarios in the original environmental situation [8,9]. In this way the structure and parameters of
the control functions are computed by using the Pontryagin maximum principle [14] for ODE ap-
proximating systems of optimal control, with some further adjustment to the parabolic dynamics
and the exclusion of unstable vibrations.
Such an analysis assumes that Nature is not malicious. On the other hand, we will see that
even if the control resources are adequate to maintain all the constraints in response to the nomi-
nal ‘worst case’ of extreme perturbations — corresponding to the afore-mentioned requirements
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to some other perturbations. Thus, without further analysis one may not be able to verify a ca-
pability to respond adequately to more subtle scenarios merely from consideration of responses
to those extreme perturbations. This might leave it unclear whether the constrained problem has
any global policy solution, certainly a crucial precondition for subsequent optimization.
The present paper is intended to make a start at providing exactly the ‘further analysis’ ad-
dressing this possibility, seeking techniques verify the existence of admissible feedback policies
— meaning causal policies which ensure satisfaction of the specified constraints in response to
all admissible perturbations — as a necessary preliminary to optimization. Even this question of
the existence of admissible feedback policies turns out to be more difficult than one might think,
and we will be unable to obtain simple necessary and sufficient conditions for existence, much
less address the optimization problem in this context.
In this paper we suggest an approach to the minimax synthesis of (hard) constrained parabolic
systems based on their reduction to asymmetric games whose dynamics are given by time convo-
lutions; see Section 3. This approach, applying to the underlying parabolic dynamics, is based on
certain fundamental properties of such systems, partly on the classical Maximum Principle for
parabolic equations. The reduction eventually allows us to clarify — via establishing conditions
for the existence of winning and losing strategies of the game players — some important char-
acteristics of feasible and optimal feedback controls and perturbations in the minimax problems
under consideration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider the original motivating
problem of automatic control of the groundwater regime in irrigation networks and formulate
it as an asymmetric game via time convolutions. Following this interpretation, we introduce in
Section 3 a general asymmetric convolution game of two players personalized as the fox and the
hound. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the convolution game establishing necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of winning strategies for the hounds. Finally, Section 5
contains various results and discussions related to the main thrust of the paper. These include:
the reduction of a general class of linear parabolic equations to convolution systems, the justi-
fication of well-posedness of the convolution game, and the implication of the game analysis to
the original irrigation problem.
2. A motivating problem: Irrigation
In this section we describe in somewhat more detail the groundwater management control
problem of [8]. Here we will be directly controlling the supply in a pair of irrigation channels
to regulate the groundwater level (GWL) in the seepage region between these channels — so-
called because of the seepage of water into the ground, approximately modeled as a diffusion.
We treat this as spatially one-dimensional, neglecting effects parallel to the channels, which are
taken at s = ±1. Letting u and w, respectively, be the deviations from the desired GWL and
the averaged external input (difference between precipitation and evaporation), these satisfy the
linear parabolic equation
ut − auss = w on Q=QT := (0, T ] × (−1,1)
with the Dirichlet boundary condition, which we take as our control: the scaled difference z(t)
between the channel water supply and a reference supply just sufficient to maintain the desired
GWL in the presence of the nominal (averaged) input. It is a reasonable approximation to take the
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|w(t)| β on [0, T ]; so y = w/β is a function only of t , satisfying∣∣y(t)∣∣ 1 for 0 t  T . (2.1)
We take the supply rate to be the same in each of the channels; the possible deviation from the
reference supply is necessarily bounded — for simplicity of exposition we assume symmetry in
this bound. Appropriately choosing α, we will have u(t,±1) = αz(t) with∣∣z(t)∣∣ 1 for 0 t  T . (2.2)
Supposing the GWL is initially at its nominal level, our complete model is
ut − auss = βy(t) on Q=QT = (0, T ] × (−1,1),
u(t,−1) = u(t,1) = αz(t), u(0, s) = 0 (2.3)
with y(·) unknown, subject to (2.1), and with control function z(·) to be chosen subject to (2.2);
we may indicate the dependence of the solution on the inputs by writing u = uy,z(·,·).
Our control problem is to regulate the GWL in the presence of unpredictable fluctuations in
precipitation/evaporation by choosing the supply rate — i.e., the control function z(·) — so as to
ensure that the level never becomes either too high or too low. We take the fluctuation in water
level as characterized by its value at the midpoint s = 0 and require that our control ensure that
the GWL stays within the prescribed tolerance:∣∣uy,z(t,0)∣∣  for 0 t  T . (2.4)
We may view this as a game played against Nature. Thus, while we are not viewing Nature
as a malicious opponent in the evolution of the disturbance w = βy, we do approach this with a
‘worst case’ attitude, avoiding any unsupportably optimistic assumption that this disturbance will
be of any special form conveniently favorable for the analysis of our control policy. In this way
(2.4) is to be taken as an imposed state constraint. Furthermore, as there is no restriction on the
external input y(·) other than (2.1), this is taken as a constraint on the control policy determining
the response z(·).
In this ‘worst case’ analysis we will view an inability to compensate for arbitrary admissible
perturbations as being a definite failure for our control system.
Observe that there are typically some other constraint requirements — assuming one could
consider them without permitting violation of the state constraint (2.4). For example, we might
wish to conserve the supplied water (minimizing the integral ∫ y dt) or to simplify the regulatory
effort (e.g., minimizing the variation in y). However, we will not address such concerns in this
paper.
The following statement justifies the possibility of describing the dynamics of (2.3) via time
convolutions with nonnegative functions.
Lemma 2.1 (Convolution description of the GWL dynamics). Let u(·) be the solution to the
parabolic partial differential equation (2.3). Then the dynamics for
x(t) := uy,z(t,0), 0 t  T ,
are given by convolution:
x(t) =
t∫
0
[
ϕ(t − τ)y(τ ) + η(t − τ)z(τ )]dτ (2.5)
with appropriate nonnegative functions ϕ and η.
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form (2.5) of these dynamics is justified with the expressions
ϕ(t) = u1,0t (t,0) and η(t) = u0,1t (t,0). (2.6)
Furthermore, the crucial fact of the positivity ϕ,η  0 is derived therein from the Maximum
Principle for parabolic equations. We will also defer to the last subsection of Section 5 for our
further investigation of specific characterizations for the appropriate ϕ and η in the particular
GWL setting of (2.3). 
Thus we have effectively replaced (2.3) by (2.5) in modeling the control problem. In view of
the comments above, we turn now to an analysis of this class of convolution games.
3. The fox and the hound: A convolution game
In this section we introduce the game G, which is the focus of our subsequent analysis. We
will be considering scalar systems with convolution dynamics — much as in (2.5), except that it
is now convenient to reverse the sign of z. Thus for each t ∈ I := [0, T ] we have
x(t) =
t∫
0
[
ϕ(t − τ)y(τ ) − η(t − τ)z(τ )]dτ. (3.1)
Note that the functions ϕ and η are given and y, z are to be inputs. One might well consider
vector-valued versions of this, but for our present purposes it will be sufficient to restrict our
attention, for simplicity, to systems (3.1) with ϕ, η, x, y, and z scalar-valued although possibly
infinite horizoned with T = ∞.
The fact that we have two input functions suggests thinking of (3.1) as the setting for a ‘game.’
We personalize this game somewhat by thinking of a fox and a hound, considered as moving
points f (·) and h(·) in R, given by the above convolutions so
f := ϕ ∗ y and h := η ∗ z in R,
i.e., controlled by providing the inputs y and z, respectively. Thus x = f − h in (3.1).
We are here taking the functions ϕ and η to be the (fixed) motion characteristics of the fox and
hound, respectively. [We ignore any physical anomalies associated with this as an image — e.g.,
we permit x(·) to cross 0, with the fox and hound apparently passing through each other.] As an
example, if the fox were to move by exerting a force F = F(t) and one had velocity-proportional
friction, then her position f (t) would satisfy
mf ′′ = F − λf ′.
If we write F = y F0, where F0 is the maximum force available — so y = 1 means “full power
ahead” and y = −1 means “full power reverse” — then, starting from rest, we would get f =
ϕ ∗ y with
ϕ(τ) = (F0/λ)
[
1 − e−(λ/m)τ ].
This would make our interpretation some sort of ‘pursuit game’ in which control lies in the ac-
celeration rather than the velocity. The history dependence implicit in the convolution dynamics
is here related to inertia.
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be assuming throughout our discussion that
ϕ and η are specified in L1loc(0,∞) with ϕ,η 0, (3.2)
and that we are imposing the constraints∣∣y(t)∣∣ 1 and ∣∣z(t)∣∣ 1 for all t ∈ I = [0, T ]. (3.3)
It will be convenient in what follows to label ϕ and η as impulse response functions and to
introduce their integral characteristics
F(t) :=
t∫
0
ϕ(τ) dτ and H(t) :=
t∫
0
η(τ) dτ ; (3.4)
so ϕ = F ′ and η = H ′. Note that F and H are nondecreasing by (3.2) and that the dynamics of
(3.1) can equivalently be written as x = f − h with
f (t) =
t∫
0
y(t − τ)ϕ(τ) dτ =
t∫
0
y(t − τ) dF (τ),
h(t) =
t∫
0
z(t − τ)η(τ ) dτ =
t∫
0
z(t − τ) dH(τ). (3.5)
While a considerable variety of interesting games might be described in this setting by ad-
justing the payoffs, our principal concern will be with the game in which the fox wins if she can
ever ‘escape’ — i.e., get f (t) farther than  from h(t) at some time t < T so that |x(t)| > .
Conversely, the hound wins if he can ‘track’ successfully — i.e., keep h(t) no farther than  from
f (t) during the entire interval I , maintaining this deviation bound throughout the interval so that∣∣x(t)∣∣  for all t in I = [0, T ]; (3.6)
there are no ties. We are then taking this game to have the payoff +∞ to the fox (and −∞ to the
hound) if she can force (3.6) to fail. [We could have a variable payoff to the hound when he can
maintain (3.6); such a variable payoff would provide the framework for subsidiary optimization
with (3.6) as an imposed constraint. However, in focusing attention on whether the constraint can
be maintained, we simplify by taking the winning payoff to the hound to be always +∞ if (3.6) is
maintained with corresponding payoff of −∞ for the fox.] Thus, once we have introduced (3.1),
(3.3), and (3.6), the game is completely specified by giving the relevant parameters ,T > 0 and
the impulse response functions ϕ,η ∈ L1(I): we refer to this as G=G(, T ;ϕ,η).
Note that the game G is asymmetric in its definition of a ‘win,’ and our primary concern
will be seeking a winning strategy for the hound. For this analysis we assume, in particular,
the necessity for the hound of protecting against a ‘worst case’ y(·): if the hound knew that
the fox generated y stochastically with a known probability distribution, then he might be able
to take advantage of this (e.g., to maximize his probability of winning). However, in a game-
theoretic context, this would be making the unsupportably optimistic assumption that the fox
might occasionally forego an assured win.
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Our analysis of the game primarily addresses the two fundamental questions:
• Does either player, the fox or the hound, have a winning strategy for the game?
• How does the answer to the question above depend on the parameters ,T ,ϕ, and η?
The first result provides verifiable conditions for winning the game expressed in terms of
integral characteristics F and H from (3.4).
Theorem 4.1 (Integral conditions for winning the game). The condition
F(T ) 
is sufficient for the hound to have an effortless ensured win. The condition
F(t)H(t) +  for every 0 < t < T (4.1)
is necessary, but not sufficient, for the hound to have a winning strategy.
Proof. Note that the above assumption (3.3) ensures that∣∣f (t)∣∣ F(t) F(T ) and ∣∣h(t)∣∣H(t)H(T ) (4.2)
— with strict inequalities unless y ≡ ±1 and z ≡ ±1, respectively.
If F(T )  , then taking z ≡ 0 would be a winning strategy for the hound, since that gives
x ≡ f , and so (4.2) implies (3.6) — the hound can simply sit still, knowing that it is impossible
for the fox to escape in time using any admissible y. However, in any other case the hound must
use an active strategy to be able to win.
If (4.1) was false, then taking y ≡ 1 would be a winning control for the fox as a fixed strategy,
since that gives f ≡ F , and then (4.2) shows that x = f −g  F −H ; so the fox escapes — i.e.,
(3.6) fails — at the same t ∈ (0, T ) for which (4.1) would fail. Thus, (4.1) is necessary for the
hound to have any chance at winning against the fox’s extreme control.
To see that (4.1) is insufficient to ensure a win for the hound, we need only provide a single
example. Take T = 2,  = 1 and suppose that
ϕ(t) =
{3 for 0 t  1,
0 else;
η(t) =
{
2 for 0 t  2,
0 else.
These impulse response functions generate by (3.4) the integral characteristics
F(t) =
{3t for 0 t  1,
3 for 1 t  2 = T ; H(t) = 2t for 0 t  T .
With  = 1 this gives the strict inequality F(t) < H(t)+ for all t ∈ [0,1), except for the equality
at t = 1; i.e., (4.1) holds, and just running away (y ≡ 1) does not enable the fox to escape from
the hound who would take z ≡ 1.
However, suppose that instead of simply running away straight ahead with y ≡ 1, the fox was
to double back at t = 1. Using the input function
y(t) =
{1 for t  1,−1 for t > 1,
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f (t) =
t∫
t−1
3z(s) ds = 3[(1 − [t − 1])− (t − 1)]= 9 − 3t
for 1  t  2 = T . Even knowing this in advance, what could the hound do? One would have
f (1) = 3 and, if z ≡ 1 on [0,1], one would have h(1) < H(1) = 2, whence |x(1)| > 1 =  —
i.e., a win for the fox. Avoiding this by keeping y ≡ 1 on [0,1], one first considers the choice
z∗(t) =
{1 for 0 t  1,
−1 for 1 t  2; so h∗(t) =
{2t for 0 t  1,
4 − 2t for 1 t  2.
Comparing, we would have x∗ = f − h∗ = 5 − 4t for 1 t  T so |x∗(t)| >  for t > 3/2 — a
win for the fox. Any other input choice z(·) with z ≡ 1 on [0,1] would necessarily give z z∗,
so h h∗ and the fox also escapes.
Thus the fox has a winning pure strategy in this example, even though F and H do sat-
isfy (4.1). Indeed, a modification of this example, changing the hound’s impulse response func-
tion to
η(t) =
{2 for 0 t  1,
7 for 1 t  2 = T
shows, by a similar calculation, that (4.1) cannot even ensure the hound’s success against the
fox’s extreme ‘running away’ strategy. 
The moral to be drawn from the scenario above is the importance of agility. For present pur-
poses, we need not provide any technical definition of this vague notion of comparative ‘agility’
while observing the competitive disadvantage of a large tail for the impulse response function,
which acts as a form of inertia. In particular, current variations of the trajectory h(t) may be
dominated by residual effects of much earlier control actions z(τ ) if the resource function η(σ )
would be large even when the time difference σ = t − τ becomes large.
Complementing Theorem 3.6, we now turn to a more positive result for a hound with his im-
pulse response function η: he can successfully track any fox whose impulse response function ϕ
lies within a distance  from the segment in L1(0, T ) joining η to the origin.
Theorem 4.2 (Impulse response function conditions for winning the game). The L1-norm condi-
tion
 min
0c1
{
‖ϕ − cη‖1 :=
1∫
0
∣∣ϕ(τ) − cη(τ)∣∣dτ} (4.3)
is sufficient, but not necessary, for the hound to have a winning strategy.
Proof. Given (4.3), the hound can choose c ∈ [0,1] such that ‖ϕ − cη‖1   and then, taking
into account Theorem 5.2 presented below, can use the control
z(τ ) = cy(τ). (4.4)
With c  1, the given constraint |y|  1 ensures that one always has |z|  1, so this control is
admissible. We then have from (3.1) that
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0
∣∣ϕ(t − τ)y(τ ) − η(t − τ)z(τ )∣∣dτ
=
t∫
0
∣∣ϕ(τ) − cη(τ)∣∣ · ∣∣y(t − τ)∣∣dτ

t∫
0
∣∣ϕ(τ) − cη(τ)∣∣dτ  ‖ϕ − cη‖1  
for each 0 t  T — i.e., one has (3.6), and thus the control policy (4.3) is a winning strategy
for the hound.
Conversely, it is necessary to have ‖ϕ − cη‖1   for the hound to use (4.4) as a winning
strategy. Indeed, if the fox knew (4.4), she could simply choose
y(t) = sgn[ϕ(t) − cη(t)], t ∈ [0, T ],
giving x(T ) = ‖ϕ − cη‖1 — and with ‖ϕ − cη‖1 >  this would be a loss for the hound.
On the other hand, there are strategies other than (4.4), and we now show that it may be
possible for the hound to have a winning strategy even with (4.3) false. To see that (4.3) is not a
necessary condition to ensure a win for the hound, we need only provide a single example. Take
 = 1, T = 3 with
ϕ(t) =
{1 for 0 t  2,
0 else;
η(t) =
{1 for 0 t  2,
3
2 else.
Thus for any 0 c 1 we have
‖ϕ − cη‖1 =
3∫
0
∣∣ϕ(τ) − cη(τ)∣∣dτ = 2∫
0
∣∣ϕ(τ) − cη(τ)∣∣dτ + 3∫
2
∣∣ϕ(τ) − cη(τ)∣∣dτ
= 2(1 − c) + (3 − 2)3
2
c = 2 − 1
2
c 3
2
> 1 = ;
so (4.3) is false for this example. [Observe, parenthetically, that with the same ,ϕ, and η we
would have (4.3) if we had taken T  8/3.]
We have seen that the strategy (4.4) now fails. On the other hand, suppose the hound modifies
this linear strategy and uses instead the piecewise constant control
z(τ ) =
{0 on [0,1],
y(τ) on (2,3]. (4.5)
Then we easily have
∣∣x(t)∣∣= ∣∣∣∣∣
t∫
0
y(τ) dτ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1 =  whenever 0 t  1.
For t ∈ (1,3] we observe that the conditions 1 τ  t give t−τ ∈ [0,2) and therefore ϕ(t−τ) =
η(t − τ). Thus for t ∈ (1,3] we have
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1∫
0
ϕ(t − τ)y(τ ) dτ +
t∫
1
[
ϕ(t − τ) − η(t − τ)]y(τ) dτ ∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
1∫
0
ϕ(t − τ)y(τ ) dτ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1 = .
This shows that (4.5) is now a winning strategy: using it, constraint (3.6) always holds for the
entire interval [0,3], and so the hound wins. 
At this time it remains an open problem to find verifiable conditions on the parameters ,T ,ϕ,
and η, which are both necessary and sufficient for the hound to win. Even though we have only
exhibited a single winning strategy for those cases where we have shown existence, it is important
for questions of possible subsidiary optimization that we would expect the basic constraint (3.6)
to provide uniqueness of the control policy only in very special cases.
5. Further results and discussions
In this section we present various results supporting and justifying the above game convolution
approach and illustrating its applications to feedback control of parabolic systems. We split our
discussions into three subsections.
5.1. Autonomous linear systems and convolutions
The classical variation of parameters formula is the source of our convolution formulation
so this is a quite general result for autonomous linear problems. Let us begin our considerations
with the abstract linear autonomous state equation
u˙ = Au+w, with u(0) = 0, (5.1)
imposing homogeneous initial conditions and input. Assuming further that the linear operator A
is the infinitesimal generator of a C0 semigroup S(·) on the state space X , we have the standard
semigroup convolution representation
u(t) =
t∫
0
S(t − τ)w(τ) dτ (5.2)
for mild solutions of the abstract differential equation (5.1); see, e.g., [2,13] as general references
for such semigroup formulations.
If we now have the scalar linear observation
x(t) = 〈γ,u(t)〉
for some suitable linear functional γ and take the input w to have the form
w =
n∑
yj (t)wj +
ν∑
z(t)ωj (5.3)
j=1 j=1
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gives
x(t) =
t∫
0
(
n∑
j=1
ϕj (t − τ)yj (τ ) +
ν∑
j=1
ηj (t − τ)zj (τ )
)
dτ (5.4)
with the impulse response functions
ϕj (t) :=
〈
γ,S(t)wj
〉
, ηj (t) :=
〈
γ,S(t)ωj
〉
. (5.5)
In particular, we have from (5.4) that ϕj = 〈γ,uj,0〉, where uj,0 = S(·)wj is the solution to
u˙j,0 = Auj,0 with uj,0∣∣
t=0 = wj , j = 1, . . . , n.
Introducing Fj and Hj much as in (3.4) (so, e.g., Fj corresponds to taking yj ≡ 1 with yk = 0
for all k = j and with zj = 0 for all j — giving ϕj = dFj/dt), we can write these functions also
in terms of solutions:
Fj (t) =
〈
γ,Uj,0(t, ·)〉, Hj (t) = 〈γ,U0,j (t, ·)〉, (5.6)
where Uj,0 and U0,j are the solutions to (5.1) with w ≡ wj and w ≡ ωj , respectively.
We will also be interested in considering similar cases in which one might not have wj or ωj in
the state space X or in which the observation functional γ may not be in X ∗. Whether this might
lead to a successful model would depend on details of regularity theory for the particular spaces
and operators involved. In particular, we wish to treat boundary control and point observation
for parabolic partial differential equations, relying on the considerable smoothing provided by
the corresponding analytic semigroups. This is given in the next theorem, which directly relates
to our original motivations and justifies the possibility to reduce feedback control problems for
linear parabolic systems to the convolution game studied in Sections 3 and 4.
Theorem 5.1 (Convolution representation of linear parabolic systems). Let Ω be a bounded
region in Rm with sufficiently smooth boundary ∂Ω , let A(·) be a smooth positive definite sym-
metric matrix-valued function on the closure of Ω , and fix s∗ ∈ Ω . We consider a parabolic
partial differential equation on Q =QT = (0, T ] × Ω with Dirichlet boundary conditions and
homogeneous initial conditions:
ut = ∇ · A∇u+
n∑
j=1
yj (t)wj , u
∣∣
∂Ω
=
ν∑
j=1
yj (t)ωj , u(0, ·) ≡ 0 (5.7)
and observe x(t) = u(t, s∗). Then, subject to some regularity considerations for wj , ωj , the point
observation x(·) is given by (5.4) with
ϕj := ∂U
j,0(t, s∗)
∂t
and ηj := ∂U
0,j (t, s∗)
∂t
,
where Uj,0 and U0,j are the solutions, respectively, to the particular cases of (5.7):
U
j,0
t = ∇ ·A∇Uj,0 +wj , Uj,0
∣∣
∂Ω
= 0, Uj,0(0, ·) ≡ 0;
U
0,j
t = ∇ ·A∇U0,j , U0,j
∣∣
∂Ω
= ωj , U0,j (0, ·) ≡ 0. (5.8)
Finally, ϕj and ηj are nonnegative when wj and ωj are nonnegative.
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on the geometry of Ω and the regularity assumed for wj ,ωj . It is well known (see, e.g., [5]
— especially the estimate in Theorem 16.3 of Chapter IV, regarding localization) that if wj
is in H−1(Ω) and moderately smooth near s∗ and if ωj is in L2(∂Ω), then (5.7) is solvable
— say, for yj and zj in L∞(0, T ) — and will be smooth enough to permit point evaluation
at s∗. Note that these conditions can be substantially weakened, but are adequate for our present
purposes. Indeed, we need only look at the regularity for the solutions Uj,0 and U0,j to (5.8).
The representation (5.4) and its consequences discussed above are then immediate.
We now employ the Maximum Principle for parabolic equations to verify the nonnegativity
asserted in the theorem. While one could also work with the classical Maximum Principle for
smooth classical solutions and then use density arguments, we here work with the weak formula-
tion of (5.7) by employing arguments requiring minimal regularity, based on the following result
by Stampacchia [16]: if
u−(t, s) := u(t, s) ∧ 0 = min{u(t, s),0},
then (writing ∂∗ for an arbitrary first partial derivative) one has
∂∗u− =
{
0 where u− = 0,
∂∗ u where u− = 0
(5.9)
almost everywhere — e.g., one has a.e. that ∇u− · ∇u = |∇u−|2. We now fix j and, assuming
ωj  0, we let u be a weak solution to
ut = ∇ ·A∇u, u
∣∣
∂Ω
= zj (t)ωj , u(0, ·) ≡ 0
with zj (·) 0. With u− as test function, the weak version of this is:∫
Ω
u−ut +
∫
Ω
∇u− · A∇u =
∫
∂Ω
u−[A∇u · n] ≡ 0,
since we have u 0 on ∂Ω so u− ≡ 0 there. From (5.9) we have
∇u− · A∇u = ∇u− · A∇u−  0,
since A was assumed positive definite. We also have
u−ut = 12d
(
u−
)2
/dt.
Integrating this (while noting that u−(0) = 0) gives
1
2
∥∥u−(t)∥∥2  0 so u− ≡ 0
which means that u 0 on Q. Thus, in particular, one evaluates at s∗ to obtain
0 u(t, s∗) =
t∫
0
ηj (t − τ)zj (τ ) dτ
whenever zj  0 on [0, t] (provided that ωj  0). [It is easy to choose yj to have a counterex-
ample to this if ηj < 0 on any set of positive measure.] Therefore, we can conclude that ηj  0
as asserted in the theorem.
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to the parabolic homogeneous initial boundary problem
ut = ∇ · A∇u+ yj (t)wj , u
∣∣
∂Ω
= 0, u(0, ·) ≡ 0;
so the weak form of this gives∫
Ω
u−ut +
∫
Ω
∇u− ·A∇u =
∫
Ω
u−yj (t)wj
with the right-hand side being nonpositive as u−  0 and yj (t)wj  0. Again we have u− ≡ 0
on Q and use this (for each yj  0) to conclude that ϕj  0. 
5.2. The information structure of the game
We should clarify the information structure of the game from the viewpoint of the hound,
noting that if G may be viewed as ‘a game with perfect information’ (like chess), then only
deterministic strategies are relevant — we need not then consider probabilistic mixed strategies.
As a worst case, we may attribute to the fox perfect causal information about both inputs y(·)
and z(·) — but, since only causally determined strategies can be admissible, we must ask what
information the hound will have available at each τ in determining his response.
We begin with the assumption that the hound knows (and remembers) his own input z(·) —
hence can compute the resulting motion h = η ∗ z — and has observed (and remembers) the
relative position x(·) = f (·)− h(·) up to that time. However, it is clear that the future evolutions
of f and h beyond τ include some history dependence — this was much of the point of our dis-
cussion of ‘agility’ following Theorem 4.1 — and, in constructing z(·), it would seem desirable
for the hound also to know at least the past history of the fox’s input y that has not been provided
directly. The next result justifies this, in a sense justifying the well-posedness of the game under
consideration by, e.g., validating the use of such strategies as (4.3).
Theorem 5.2 (Well-posedness of the game). Let ϕ and η be given in L1[0, T ] with ϕ ≡ 0 near 0.
Then the histories of z and of
x = ϕ ∗ y − η ∗ z
on any subinterval [0, τ ] as τ  T uniquely determine the past history of y on [0, τ ].
Proof. Take ϕτ and ητ to be the restrictions of ϕ and η to [0, τ ], respectively, that are taken
to vanish outside [0, τ ] (since anything else is irrelevant up to time τ ) and similarly define yτ ,
and zτ . Hence xτ (·), defined by the convolutions
xτ = ϕτ ∗ yτ − ητ ∗ zτ ,
coincides with x = ϕ ∗ y − η ∗ z on [0, τ ]. Taking the Fourier transforms [15] of these functions
(denoted by ‘hat’ as usual), the above convolutions become simply products. Thus, rearranging
slightly, we have
ϕ̂τ ŷτ = η̂τ ẑτ + x̂τ .
Note that ητ , zτ , xτ are known at time τ (by prescription, memory, and observation); so the
product η̂τ ẑτ is also known. Since ϕτ and yτ have compact support [0, τ ], each of the factors ϕ̂τ
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vanishing at most at isolated points — so ŷτ is uniquely determined. Hence, inverting the Fourier
transform, yτ is also uniquely determined as asserted. Note that this argument is independent of
the horizon T , we might even take T = ∞. 
Thus, despite the nominal asymmetry of the suggested information structure, we may actually
assume that at each τ ∈ [0, T ] both the fox and the hound have perfect causal information know-
ing both input functions y and z on [0, τ ] — as well, of course, as knowing the impulse response
functions ϕ and η.
We may remark, in this connection, that we are here assuming exact observation and compu-
tation, ignoring for now any concern for continuity of the maps zτ , xτ → yτ whose existence has
been assured by Theorem 5.2. However, our discussion has justified the admissibility of strategies
such as (4.4) or (4.5).
5.3. The irrigation problem: Reprise
We now wish to compute more specifically the functions ϕ and η for the special case of (2.3),
which came from the original motivation.
As a particular case of our discussion in Section 5.1, we already know that H(·) for (2.3) can
be obtained as αU0,1(·,0), where U0,1 is the solution to
U
0,1
t − aU0,1ss = 0 on QT , U0,1(t,−1) = U0,1(t,1) = 1, U0,1(0, ·) ≡ 0.
This function has singularities only at (0,±1) — it is analytic on QT = (0, T ] × (−1,1) and
C∞ across t = 0 (while taking U0,1(t, ·) ≡ 0 for t < 0). As t → ∞ we would have the monotone
increasing convergence of U0,1 to the steady state solution≡ 1. The function η = H ′ is positive
and unimodal, decaying exponentially to 0 as t → ∞; we have
η[k](0) = 0 for k = 0,1, . . . and
∞∫
0
η(τ) · τ = α.
For later purposes we now introduce the solution V to
Vt − aVss = 0 on QT , V (t,−1) = V (t,1) = t, V (0, ·) ≡ 0
and, differentiating this with respect to t , observe that Vt = U0,1 since it satisfies the same equa-
tion. Thus
αV (t,1) =
t∫
0
H(τ)dτ.
We know, similarly, that F(t) = βU1,0(t,0), where U1,0 is the solution to
U
1,0
t − aU1,0ss = 1 on QT , U1,0(t,−1) = U1,0(t,1) = 0, U1,0(0, ·) ≡ 0;
again this is analytic on QT = (0, T ] × (−1,1) although not C∞ across t = 0. Defining now
W := t − U1,0, we see that
Wt = 1 −U1,0t = 1 −
[
aU1,0ss + 1
]= aWss
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same system as V by showing that U1,0 = t − V . Evaluating at s = 0 and differentiating, the
latter implies that
ϕ(t) = F ′(t) = β[1 − H(t)/α] and η(t) = −(α/β)ϕ′(t). (5.10)
Thus we get from this that ϕ(0) = β with ϕ decreasing exponentially to 0, and then ϕ[k](0) = 0
for all k = 1,2, . . . .
What then are the implications for the groundwater management control problem of Section 2,
which motivated our analysis? It is clear thatG(, T ,ϕ,η) — with the functions ϕ and η we have
just computed — corresponds precisely to the groundwater management problem, except for a
formal sign reversal for the interpretation of the control function z. The information we have just
gathered about ϕ,η and their relation shows that ϕ is comparatively more agile than η in the sense
of Section 4, so we expect considerable difficulty regarding the feasibility of this control problem
without a substantial tolerance . It would certainly be of interest to determine numerically the
minimal  for which condition (4.3) would hold here, with its dependence on T and α/β .
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